Doctoral Dissertation Research: Major Power States and Limited War

Why do major power states frequently fail to achieve even limited objectives when they use military force against vastly weaker targets? Recent research suggests that war outcomes are largely a function of strategic selection (war initiation), military-industrial capabilities, combat effectiveness, and strategy choice. But this model cannot explain why a major power would ever lose an armed conflict with a weak target. As the initiators of military interventions, major powers have the advantage of selecting

their target. Additionally, in post-WWII major power military interventions, the major powers invariably possess vastly superior military-industrial capabilities, higher quality troops, better leadership, and, unlike their targets, the ability to successfully execute even the most difficult and complicated military strategies (e.g. maneuver or combined arms strategies). Yet, frequently, the intervening major power is not able to achieve its war aims, or, if it does secure its objectives, success is temporary and the state is not able to maintain the objective (Arreguin-Toft 2001; Blechman and Kaplan 1978).

The student argues that the existence of political constraints on the ability of major power states to pursue their objectives to the full extent of their capabilities is a primary, but often neglected, or poorly operationalized, factor that can account for the discrepancy between outcomes predicted based on capabilities and observed outcomes in asymmetric conflicts. In particular, certain domestic political characteristics of the intervening state, attributes of the conflict, and characteristics of the international strategic context in which an intervention takes place can create constraints on the ability of major power leaders to use force effectively. Under some circumstances, domestic political and international strategic constraints become the primary determinants of violent conflict outcomes. This is particularly problematic for major power states that use force against minor power or non-state targets because, for the major power state, these interventions are initiated for limited aims, in the absence of a credible claim to

self-defense, and in a context of numerous competing international concerns and commitments.

Standard models of war outcomes are built on the implicit assumption that both sides bring the full force of their capabilities to bear in a conflict. The primary predictors in such models are variables that capture potential power rather actual (situation specific) power. As a result, they are less able to explain conflict outcomes the more limited the conflict is for one side.

This study develops a model of military intervention outcomes that accounts for the fact that leaders must make operational decisions about foreign conflict prosecution within the confines of competing domestic political and geostrategic concerns.

To test the hypotheses derived from this model, this project develops an original dataset of all major power military interventions since the Second World War and conducts aggregate analyses employing event history statistical techniques including competing-risks hazard analysis, an estimation procedure appropriate for questions pertaining to the impact of explanatory factors on both the outcome and duration of events.

This study's focus on the dynamics of major power military intervention is particularly relevant in the current international climate, in which a major power war is much less likely than a series of violent contests between major power states and inrogueli states or non-state actors. Better theory and empirical evidence on the factors that affect the ability of states to achieve their political objectives through the use of force may at times allow decision-makers to design more effective military interventions. At other times, however, it may caution them against the use of force altogether.

The results of this project will address: 1) the influence of political constraints on the propensity of major power leaders to maintain, escalate, or withdraw from military operations abroad, 2) the affect of domestic political and geostrategic factors on intervention outcomes and duration, and 3) the conditions under which domestic political and geostrategic constraints have a significant effect on the conduct of foreign military operations. In addition to its theoretical and empirical contributions, this project will

result in a detailed and comprehensive dataset of post-WWII major power military operations, which will be made widely available to the social scientific community.