TY - GEN
T1 - A game theoretic treatment for pair-wise secret-key generation in many-to-one networks
AU - Chou, Remi A.
AU - Yener, Aylin
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by NSF grant CNS-1314719.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IEEE.
PY - 2017/8/9
Y1 - 2017/8/9
N2 - We consider secret-key generation between several agents and a base station that observe independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) realizations of correlated random variables. Each agent wishes to generate the longest possible individual key with the base station by means of public communication. All keys must be jointly kept secret from all external entities. We do not require them to be kept secret among the agents. In this many-to-one secret-key generation setting, it can be shown that the agents can take advantage of a collective protocol to increase the sum-rate of all the generated keys. However, when each agent is only interested in maximizing its own secret-key rate, agents may be unwilling to participate in a collective protocol. Furthermore, when such a collective protocol is employed, how to fairly allocate individual key rates arises as a valid issue. We study this tension between cooperation and self-interest with a game-theoretic treatment. We establish that cooperation is in the best interest of all agents and that there exists individual secret-key rate allocations that incentivize the agents to follow the protocol. Additionally, we propose an explicit and low-complexity coding scheme based on polar codes and hash functions that achieves such allocations.
AB - We consider secret-key generation between several agents and a base station that observe independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) realizations of correlated random variables. Each agent wishes to generate the longest possible individual key with the base station by means of public communication. All keys must be jointly kept secret from all external entities. We do not require them to be kept secret among the agents. In this many-to-one secret-key generation setting, it can be shown that the agents can take advantage of a collective protocol to increase the sum-rate of all the generated keys. However, when each agent is only interested in maximizing its own secret-key rate, agents may be unwilling to participate in a collective protocol. Furthermore, when such a collective protocol is employed, how to fairly allocate individual key rates arises as a valid issue. We study this tension between cooperation and self-interest with a game-theoretic treatment. We establish that cooperation is in the best interest of all agents and that there exists individual secret-key rate allocations that incentivize the agents to follow the protocol. Additionally, we propose an explicit and low-complexity coding scheme based on polar codes and hash functions that achieves such allocations.
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U2 - 10.1109/ISIT.2017.8006784
DO - 10.1109/ISIT.2017.8006784
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85034069409
T3 - IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
SP - 1524
EP - 1528
BT - 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2017
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2017
Y2 - 25 June 2017 through 30 June 2017
ER -