Abstract
A simple matching-model of money with the potential for counterfeiting is constructed. In contrast to the existing literature, lotteries are included. These provide scope for the operation of the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps. The application of that refinement is shown to imply that there is no equilibrium with counterfeiting. If the cost of producing counterfeits is low enough, then there is no monetary equilibrium. Otherwise, there is a monetary equilibrium without counterfeiting. In other words, the threat of counterfeiting can eliminate the monetary equilibrium.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 994-1001 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Journal of Monetary Economics |
Volume | 54 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2007 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics