A new Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) algorithm for preventing cache timing attack

Jalpa Bani; Syed S. Rizvi

doi:10.1109/WTS.2008.4547594

A new Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) algorithm for preventing cache timing attack

Jalpa Bani, Syed S. Rizvi

Division of Business, Engineering, and Information Sciences & Technology (Altoona)

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Rijndael algorithm was unanimously chosen as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by the panel of researchers at National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in October 2000. Since then, Rijndael was destined to be used massively in various software as well as hardware entities for encrypting data. However, a few years back, Daniel Bernstein [2] devised a cache-timing attack that was capable enough to break Rijndael's seal that encapsulates the encryption key. In this paper, we propose a new Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) algorithm which shows a set of pragmatic software measures that would make Rijndael impregnable to cache timing attack. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed DCF algorithm provides better security by encrypting key at a constant time.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	7th Annual Wireless Telecommunications Symposium, WTS 2008
Pages	399-404
Number of pages	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/WTS.2008.4547594
State	Published - 2008
Event	7th Annual Wireless Telecommunications Symposium, WTS 2008 - Ponoma, CA, United States Duration: Apr 24 2008 → Apr 26 2008

Publication series

Name	7th Annual Wireless Telecommunications Symposium, WTS 2008

Other

Other	7th Annual Wireless Telecommunications Symposium, WTS 2008
Country/Territory	United States
City	Ponoma, CA
Period	4/24/08 → 4/26/08

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Computer Networks and Communications
Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Communication

Access to Document

10.1109/WTS.2008.4547594

Cite this

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title = "A new Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) algorithm for preventing cache timing attack",

abstract = "Rijndael algorithm was unanimously chosen as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by the panel of researchers at National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in October 2000. Since then, Rijndael was destined to be used massively in various software as well as hardware entities for encrypting data. However, a few years back, Daniel Bernstein [2] devised a cache-timing attack that was capable enough to break Rijndael's seal that encapsulates the encryption key. In this paper, we propose a new Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) algorithm which shows a set of pragmatic software measures that would make Rijndael impregnable to cache timing attack. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed DCF algorithm provides better security by encrypting key at a constant time.",

author = "Jalpa Bani and Rizvi, {Syed S.}",

year = "2008",

doi = "10.1109/WTS.2008.4547594",

language = "English (US)",

isbn = "9781424418701",

series = "7th Annual Wireless Telecommunications Symposium, WTS 2008",

pages = "399--404",

booktitle = "7th Annual Wireless Telecommunications Symposium, WTS 2008",

note = "7th Annual Wireless Telecommunications Symposium, WTS 2008 ; Conference date: 24-04-2008 Through 26-04-2008",

}

Bani, J & Rizvi, SS 2008, A new Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) algorithm for preventing cache timing attack. in 7th Annual Wireless Telecommunications Symposium, WTS 2008., 4547594, 7th Annual Wireless Telecommunications Symposium, WTS 2008, pp. 399-404, 7th Annual Wireless Telecommunications Symposium, WTS 2008, Ponoma, CA, United States, 4/24/08. https://doi.org/10.1109/WTS.2008.4547594

TY - GEN

T1 - A new Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) algorithm for preventing cache timing attack

AU - Bani, Jalpa

AU - Rizvi, Syed S.

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - Rijndael algorithm was unanimously chosen as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by the panel of researchers at National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in October 2000. Since then, Rijndael was destined to be used massively in various software as well as hardware entities for encrypting data. However, a few years back, Daniel Bernstein [2] devised a cache-timing attack that was capable enough to break Rijndael's seal that encapsulates the encryption key. In this paper, we propose a new Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) algorithm which shows a set of pragmatic software measures that would make Rijndael impregnable to cache timing attack. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed DCF algorithm provides better security by encrypting key at a constant time.

AB - Rijndael algorithm was unanimously chosen as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by the panel of researchers at National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in October 2000. Since then, Rijndael was destined to be used massively in various software as well as hardware entities for encrypting data. However, a few years back, Daniel Bernstein [2] devised a cache-timing attack that was capable enough to break Rijndael's seal that encapsulates the encryption key. In this paper, we propose a new Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) algorithm which shows a set of pragmatic software measures that would make Rijndael impregnable to cache timing attack. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed DCF algorithm provides better security by encrypting key at a constant time.

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M3 - Conference contribution

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BT - 7th Annual Wireless Telecommunications Symposium, WTS 2008

T2 - 7th Annual Wireless Telecommunications Symposium, WTS 2008

Y2 - 24 April 2008 through 26 April 2008

ER -

A new Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) algorithm for preventing cache timing attack

Abstract

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