Abstract
Models of labor contracts under asymmetric information may predict either overemployment or underemployment. This paper shows that this result depends crucially on whether or not leisure is a normal good if firms are risk neutral.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 81-87 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 1983 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
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