A simple reputation model for BitTorrent-like incentives

A. Tangpong; George Kesidis

doi:10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137450

A simple reputation model for BitTorrent-like incentives

A. Tangpong, George Kesidis

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study how BitTorrent exhibits peer clustering In terms of transaction success rate which is based on allocated uplink bandwidths for the purposes of file-swapping. The effects of optimistic unchoking and dissemination of choke lists are also considered. Under dynamic uplink assignment similar grouping results based on differences in how users derive utility from transaction success rates. The "limited information" game requires users periodically assess the effect of a change in uplink. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of how to extend the model to consider the complicating factors such as transient swarm behavior and peer churn.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
Pages	603-610
Number of pages	8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137450
State	Published - 2009
Event	2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 - Istanbul, Turkey Duration: May 13 2009 → May 15 2009

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09

Other

Other	2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
Country/Territory	Turkey
City	Istanbul
Period	5/13/09 → 5/15/09

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Computer Networks and Communications
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

Access to Document

10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137450

Cite this

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title = "A simple reputation model for BitTorrent-like incentives",

abstract = "We study how BitTorrent exhibits peer clustering In terms of transaction success rate which is based on allocated uplink bandwidths for the purposes of file-swapping. The effects of optimistic unchoking and dissemination of choke lists are also considered. Under dynamic uplink assignment similar grouping results based on differences in how users derive utility from transaction success rates. The {"}limited information{"} game requires users periodically assess the effect of a change in uplink. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of how to extend the model to consider the complicating factors such as transient swarm behavior and peer churn.",

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pages = "603--610",

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note = "2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 ; Conference date: 13-05-2009 Through 15-05-2009",

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Tangpong, A & Kesidis, G 2009, A simple reputation model for BitTorrent-like incentives. in Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09., 5137450, Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09, pp. 603-610, 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09, Istanbul, Turkey, 5/13/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137450

A simple reputation model for BitTorrent-like incentives. / Tangpong, A.; Kesidis, George.
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09. 2009. p. 603-610 5137450 (Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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A simple reputation model for BitTorrent-like incentives

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