Affirmative action: One size does not fit all

Kala Krishna; Alexander Tarasov

doi:10.1257/mic.20140200

Affirmative action: One size does not fit all

Kala Krishna, Alexander Tarasov

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working in favor of them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the United States), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	215-252
Number of pages	38
Journal	American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume	8
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140200
State	Published - May 1 2016

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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10.1257/mic.20140200

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abstract = "This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working in favor of them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the United States), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving.",

author = "Kala Krishna and Alexander Tarasov",

note = "Funding Information: We thank the participants at the CESifo Area Conference on Applied Microeconomics and the 19th Conference of the SFB/TR (Berlin) for valuable comments and suggestions. Krishna would like to thank the Human Capital Foundation for support to the Economics Department at The Pennsylvania State University, the Economics Department at New York University, and the Cowles Foundation at Yale for support as a visitor while this paper was being finished. Tarasov gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15.",

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Affirmative action: One size does not fit all

Abstract

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