Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration


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95 Scopus citations


In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of “bonding” executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards actions that are in the long‐run interest of the stockholders. Firms must take into account their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances from mismanagement, the extent to which a compensation package forces the executive to face risks beyond his control, and the willingness of a given executive to bear this risk. We use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from the early 1970s. 1983 The American Finance Association

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1489-1506
Number of pages18
JournalThe Journal of Finance
Issue number5
StatePublished - Dec 1983

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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