Agency problems and interest representation: An empirical analysis of the costs of lobbying

Eleanor L. Schiff; Kim Seufer; Anne Whitesell; David Lowery

doi:10.1057/iga.2015.4

Agency problems and interest representation: An empirical analysis of the costs of lobbying

Eleanor L. Schiff, Kim Seufer, Anne Whitesell, David Lowery

Political Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

Most recent work on the politics of interest representation assumes that lobbyistsrepresent their clients' interests with fidelity. We test the validity of this assumption.Relying on a principal-agent framework developed by Stephenson and Jackson, Kersh andLowery and Marchetti, we first discuss the nature of agency problems in lobbying and theutility of several potential solutions for those problems.We next develop and test two sets ofhypotheses on how agency problems might influence one form of lobbying behavior - theprices contract lobby firms charge their interest organization principals. The hypotheses aretested with a purposive sample of clients employing major contract lobby firms operating in Washington DC in 2012.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	225-248
Number of pages	24
Journal	Interest Groups and Advocacy
Volume	4
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2015.4
State	Published - Sep 1 2015

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Sociology and Political Science

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10.1057/iga.2015.4

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abstract = "Most recent work on the politics of interest representation assumes that lobbyistsrepresent their clients' interests with fidelity. We test the validity of this assumption.Relying on a principal-agent framework developed by Stephenson and Jackson, Kersh andLowery and Marchetti, we first discuss the nature of agency problems in lobbying and theutility of several potential solutions for those problems.We next develop and test two sets ofhypotheses on how agency problems might influence one form of lobbying behavior - theprices contract lobby firms charge their interest organization principals. The hypotheses aretested with a purposive sample of clients employing major contract lobby firms operating in Washington DC in 2012.",

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Agency problems and interest representation: An empirical analysis of the costs of lobbying

Abstract

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