Ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices

Richard D. Horan, James S. Shortle, David G. Abler

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

80 Scopus citations


Ambient-based tax-subsidy schemes have drawn considerable interest in nonpoint pollution literature as alternatives to emissions-based instruments. Expanding especially on Segerson's [J. Environ. Econom. Management 15, 88-98 (1988)] seminal article, this article examines the optimal design and budget-balancing properties of ambient tax-subsidy schemes under more realistic assumptions about the dimensions of firms' choice sets than prior research.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)186-199
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Issue number2
StatePublished - Sep 1998

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law


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