TY - GEN
T1 - Analysis of crosstalk in NISQ devices and security implications in multi-programming regime
AU - Ash-Saki, Abdullah
AU - Alam, Mahabubul
AU - Ghosh, Swaroop
N1 - Funding Information:
The work is supported in parts by National Science Foundation (NSF) (CNS-1722557, CCF-1718474, DGE-1723687 and DGE-1821766) and seed grants from Penn State Institute for Computational and Data Sciences and Penn State Huck Institute of the Life Sciences.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 ACM.
PY - 2020/8/10
Y1 - 2020/8/10
N2 - The noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) computers suffer from unwanted coupling across qubits referred to as crosstalk. Existing literature largely ignores the crosstalk effects which can introduce significant error in circuit optimization. In this work, we present a crosstalk modeling analysis framework for near-Term quantum computers after extracting the error-rates experimentally. Our analysis reveals that crosstalk can be of the same order of gate error which is considered a dominant error in NISQ devices. We also propose adversarial fault injection using crosstalk in a multiprogramming environment where the victim and the adversary share the same quantum hardware. Our simulation and experimental results from IBM quantum computers demonstrated that the adversary can inject fault and launch a Denial-of-Service attack. Finally, we propose system-and device-level countermeasures.
AB - The noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) computers suffer from unwanted coupling across qubits referred to as crosstalk. Existing literature largely ignores the crosstalk effects which can introduce significant error in circuit optimization. In this work, we present a crosstalk modeling analysis framework for near-Term quantum computers after extracting the error-rates experimentally. Our analysis reveals that crosstalk can be of the same order of gate error which is considered a dominant error in NISQ devices. We also propose adversarial fault injection using crosstalk in a multiprogramming environment where the victim and the adversary share the same quantum hardware. Our simulation and experimental results from IBM quantum computers demonstrated that the adversary can inject fault and launch a Denial-of-Service attack. Finally, we propose system-and device-level countermeasures.
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U2 - 10.1145/3370748.3406570
DO - 10.1145/3370748.3406570
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85098251309
T3 - ACM International Conference Proceeding Series
BT - Proceedings of the ACM/IEEE International Symposium on Low Power Electronics and Design, ISLPED 2020
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
T2 - 2020 ACM/IEEE International Symposium on Low Power Electronics and Design, ISLPED 2020
Y2 - 10 August 2020 through 12 August 2020
ER -