TY - GEN
T1 - Architectures for intrusion tolerant database systems
AU - Liu, Peng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2002 IEEE.
PY - 2002
Y1 - 2002
N2 - In this paper we propose four architectures for intrusion-tolerant database systems. While traditional secure database systems rely on prevention controls, an intrusion-tolerant database system can operate through attacks in such a way that the system can continue delivering essential services in the face of attacks. With a focus on attacks by malicious transactions, Architecture I can detect intrusions, and locate and repair the damage caused by the intrusions. Architecture II enhances Architecture I with the ability to isolate attacks so that the database can be immunized from the damage caused by a lot of attacks. Architecture III enhances Architecture I with the ability to dynamically contain the damage in such a way that no damage will leak out during the attack recovery process. Architecture IV enhances Architectures II and III with the ability to adapt the intrusion-tolerance controls to the changing environment so that a stabilized level of trustworthiness can be maintained. Architecture IV enhances Architecture IV with the ability to deliver differential, quantitative QoIA services to customers who have subscribed for these services even in the face of attacks.
AB - In this paper we propose four architectures for intrusion-tolerant database systems. While traditional secure database systems rely on prevention controls, an intrusion-tolerant database system can operate through attacks in such a way that the system can continue delivering essential services in the face of attacks. With a focus on attacks by malicious transactions, Architecture I can detect intrusions, and locate and repair the damage caused by the intrusions. Architecture II enhances Architecture I with the ability to isolate attacks so that the database can be immunized from the damage caused by a lot of attacks. Architecture III enhances Architecture I with the ability to dynamically contain the damage in such a way that no damage will leak out during the attack recovery process. Architecture IV enhances Architectures II and III with the ability to adapt the intrusion-tolerance controls to the changing environment so that a stabilized level of trustworthiness can be maintained. Architecture IV enhances Architecture IV with the ability to deliver differential, quantitative QoIA services to customers who have subscribed for these services even in the face of attacks.
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U2 - 10.1109/CSAC.2002.1176303
DO - 10.1109/CSAC.2002.1176303
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84948950072
T3 - Proceedings - Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC
SP - 311
EP - 320
BT - Proceedings - 18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2002
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2002
Y2 - 9 December 2002 through 13 December 2002
ER -