Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

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I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics. I also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)684-702
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
StatePublished - Sep 1 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


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