Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

Ron Siegel

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.003

Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

Ron Siegel

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

50 Scopus citations

Abstract

I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics. I also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	684-702
Number of pages	19
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	153
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.003
State	Published - Sep 1 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.003

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abstract = "I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics. I also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced.",

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AB - I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics. I also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced.

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Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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