Auctions with endogenous valuations: The snowball effect revisited

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17 Scopus citations


This paper looks at the determination of ownership of capacity when there are two ex-ante symmetric agents bidding for many units of capacity which are sold sequentially. It is shown that convexity of payoffs in the final stage of the game is sufficient to ensure monopolization of capacity, but that increasing returns to scale are not sufficient to ensure monopolization.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)377-391
Number of pages15
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Jan 1 1999

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


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