TY - JOUR
T1 - Autocratic Legislatures and Expropriation Risk
AU - Wilson, Matthew Charles
AU - Wright, Joseph
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Cambridge University Press 2015.
PY - 2017/1/1
Y1 - 2017/1/1
N2 - An important question for international investors concerns the relationship between political institutions and property rights. Yet a debate remains over whether authoritarian institutions promote favorable investment climates. Using data on oil nationalization in a sample of autocracies, this study finds that legislatures are correlated with lower expropriation risk in non-personalist dictatorships, but a higher risk of nationalization in personalist regimes. The results show a consistent pattern between authoritarian institutions and property protections, for which context matters.
AB - An important question for international investors concerns the relationship between political institutions and property rights. Yet a debate remains over whether authoritarian institutions promote favorable investment climates. Using data on oil nationalization in a sample of autocracies, this study finds that legislatures are correlated with lower expropriation risk in non-personalist dictatorships, but a higher risk of nationalization in personalist regimes. The results show a consistent pattern between authoritarian institutions and property protections, for which context matters.
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U2 - 10.1017/S0007123415000149
DO - 10.1017/S0007123415000149
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84930360705
SN - 0007-1234
VL - 47
SP - 1
EP - 17
JO - British Journal of Political Science
JF - British Journal of Political Science
IS - 1
ER -