Autonomy, negativity, and the challenge of spinozism in Hegel's Science of Logic

Hegel's Science of Logic weds a deduction of (broadly Kantian) categories with a vindication of unconditional self-determination. Motivating his project is the challenge of nihilism implicit in Spinoza's rationalism-cum-naturalism. Section one of this paper examines Spinozist 'substance' and Hegel's revision of the principle omnis determinatio est negatio. Section two analyzes the concept 'being-for-self' in relation to Kantian apperception and the Hegelian idea of sublation. Section three presents a novel view of Hegel's infamous identification of being and nothing at the opening of the Logic. The notions of unconditional self-determination, original synthetic unity, and absolute negativity are shown to govern Hegel's dual reception of Spinoza and Kant.