TY - JOUR
T1 - Bank and Nonbank Lenders and the Commercial Mortgage Market
AU - Ambrose, Brent W.
AU - Benjamin, John D.
AU - Chinloy, Peter
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful to Mustafa Chowdhury, Robert Edelstein, William Hughes, Nancy Wallace, seminar participants at University of California-Berkeley and a referee for comments, and to the American Council of Life Insurers and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development for providing data. Brent Ambrose acknowledges the financial support of the Samuel Zell and Robert Lurie Real Estate Center Research Sponsors Program at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
PY - 2003/1
Y1 - 2003/1
N2 - This paper develops an equilibrium model of the commercial mortgage market that includes the sequence from commitment to origination and allows testing for differences by type of lender. From borrowers, loan demand is based on the income yield, capital gains, and expectations about return distributions. Lenders use prices such as mortgage rates and their distributions, and quantities in underwriting standards. There are separate equilibria in the markets for loan commitments and originations. Bank and nonbank lenders are not restricted to the same lending technology, nor to the weights placed on mortgage rates as opposed to underwriting standards. Empirical results for the United States commercial mortgage market indicate that banks use interest rates in allocating credit while nonbanks rely on underwriting standards, notably the loan-to-value ratio. A consequence is that nonbanks have a clientele incentive towards making low cap rate loans compensated by low loan-to-value ratios.
AB - This paper develops an equilibrium model of the commercial mortgage market that includes the sequence from commitment to origination and allows testing for differences by type of lender. From borrowers, loan demand is based on the income yield, capital gains, and expectations about return distributions. Lenders use prices such as mortgage rates and their distributions, and quantities in underwriting standards. There are separate equilibria in the markets for loan commitments and originations. Bank and nonbank lenders are not restricted to the same lending technology, nor to the weights placed on mortgage rates as opposed to underwriting standards. Empirical results for the United States commercial mortgage market indicate that banks use interest rates in allocating credit while nonbanks rely on underwriting standards, notably the loan-to-value ratio. A consequence is that nonbanks have a clientele incentive towards making low cap rate loans compensated by low loan-to-value ratios.
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U2 - 10.1023/A:1021574215894
DO - 10.1023/A:1021574215894
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0037240966
SN - 0895-5638
VL - 26
SP - 81
EP - 94
JO - Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
JF - Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
IS - 1
ER -