Bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options

Kalyan Chatterjee; Ching Chyi Lee

doi:10.1142/9789814447577_0002

Bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options

Kalyan Chatterjee, Ching Chyi Lee

Economics

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

This paper considers a model of bargaining in which the seller makes offers and the buyer can search (at a cost) for an outside option; the outside option cannot be credibly communicated, and the seller's offer is recallable by the buyer for one period. There are essentially two equilibrium regimes. For sufficiently high search cost, the game ends immediately; otherwise the search occurs in equilibrium. Compared to the case where the buyer can communicate his outside option, the seller is worse off, and the game results in search for a smaller set of values of the search cost, i.e., less equilibrium delay. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market
Subtitle of host publication	Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining
Publisher	World Scientific Publishing Co.
Pages	15-50
Number of pages	36
ISBN (Electronic)	9789814447577
ISBN (Print)	9814447560, 9789814447560
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814447577_0002
State	Published - Jan 1 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Business, Management and Accounting
Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
General Mathematics

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10.1142/9789814447577_0002

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Bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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