TY - GEN
T1 - Becoming cybercriminals
T2 - 7th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2016
AU - Laszka, Aron
AU - Schwartz, Galina
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by FORCES (Foundations Of Resilient CybEr-Physical Systems), which receives support from the National Science Foundation (NSF award numbers CNS-1238959, CNS-1238962, CNS-1239054, CNS-1239166).
Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing AG 2016.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - We study users’ incentives to become cybercriminals when network security is interdependent. We present a game-theoretic model in which each player (i.e., network user) decides his type, honest or malicious. Honest users represent law-abiding network users, while malicious users represent cybercriminals. After deciding on their types, the users make their security choices. We will follow [29], where breach probabilities for large-scale networks are obtained from a standard interdependent security (IDS) setup. In large-scale IDS networks, the breach probability of each player becomes a function of two variables: the player’s own security action and network security, which is an aggregate characteristic of the network; network security is computed from the security actions of the individual nodes that comprise the network. This allows us to quantify user security choices in networks with IDS even when users have only very limited, aggregate information about security choices of other users of the network.
AB - We study users’ incentives to become cybercriminals when network security is interdependent. We present a game-theoretic model in which each player (i.e., network user) decides his type, honest or malicious. Honest users represent law-abiding network users, while malicious users represent cybercriminals. After deciding on their types, the users make their security choices. We will follow [29], where breach probabilities for large-scale networks are obtained from a standard interdependent security (IDS) setup. In large-scale IDS networks, the breach probability of each player becomes a function of two variables: the player’s own security action and network security, which is an aggregate characteristic of the network; network security is computed from the security actions of the individual nodes that comprise the network. This allows us to quantify user security choices in networks with IDS even when users have only very limited, aggregate information about security choices of other users of the network.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-47413-7_20
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-47413-7_20
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84994845401
SN - 9783319474120
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 349
EP - 369
BT - Decision and Game Theory for Security - 7th International Conference, GameSec 2016, Proceedings
A2 - Panaousis, Emmanouil
A2 - Tambe, Milind
A2 - Alpcan, Tansu
A2 - Casey, William
A2 - Zhu, Quanyan
PB - Springer Verlag
Y2 - 2 November 2016 through 4 November 2016
ER -