CEO SUCCESSION AND COMPETITIVE ATTACKS FROM RIVALS

Eric Y. Lee, Wenpin Tsai

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

Abstract

CEO succession may be a disruptive event and thus an opportune time for rivals to engage in competitive attacks against the focal firm, particularly when the successor is very different from the predecessor in terms of professional experience. We argue that the effect of predecessorsuccessor experience differential on being attacked is contingent upon the focal firm’s level of dedicated ownership or decision to keep the predecessor on the board. We find support for our propositions that strong governance may ward off rivals’ competitive attacks when a focal firm is hiring a new CEO who is drastically different from the predecessor.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalAcademy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings
Volume2022
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2022
Event82nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2022 - Seattle, United States
Duration: Aug 5 2022Aug 9 2022

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Management Information Systems
  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Industrial relations

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