Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Machiavellianism and Executive Pay

Tessa Recendes; Aaron D. Hill; Federico Aime; Jason W. Ridge; Oleg V. Petrenko

doi:10.1037/apl0001290

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Machiavellianism and Executive Pay

Tessa Recendes
, Aaron D. Hill
, Federico Aime
, Jason W. Ridge
, Oleg V. Petrenko

Management and Organization

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Integrating theory and evidence about Machiavellianism (Mach) into executive pay-setting research, we theorize about how chief executive officers (CEOs) higher in Mach may be both more motivated to initiate negotiations and more effective in utilizing social influence tactics in the pay-setting process, thus positively relating to their own pay outcomes. Specifically, we first theorize that CEO Mach positively associates with a CEO’s total pay and severance pay. Moreover, because paying top management team (TMT) members more is also in CEOs’ interests—such as to help build TMT loyalty and cooperation, aid hiring, and ease retention while also narrowing the CEO-TMT pay differential to thus provide an impetus for a CEO pay raise—we argue that CEO Mach positively relates to TMT pay as well. Using a longitudinal sample of S&P 500 firms and clinical psychologists trained to assess CEO Mach from publicly available data, we find evidence supporting our theorizing.

Original language	English (US)
Journal	Journal of Applied Psychology
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0001290
State	Accepted/In press - 2025

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Applied Psychology

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10.1037/apl0001290

Cite this

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title = "Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Machiavellianism and Executive Pay",

abstract = "Integrating theory and evidence about Machiavellianism (Mach) into executive pay-setting research, we theorize about how chief executive officers (CEOs) higher in Mach may be both more motivated to initiate negotiations and more effective in utilizing social influence tactics in the pay-setting process, thus positively relating to their own pay outcomes. Specifically, we first theorize that CEO Mach positively associates with a CEO{\textquoteright}s total pay and severance pay. Moreover, because paying top management team (TMT) members more is also in CEOs{\textquoteright} interests—such as to help build TMT loyalty and cooperation, aid hiring, and ease retention while also narrowing the CEO-TMT pay differential to thus provide an impetus for a CEO pay raise—we argue that CEO Mach positively relates to TMT pay as well. Using a longitudinal sample of S\&P 500 firms and clinical psychologists trained to assess CEO Mach from publicly available data, we find evidence supporting our theorizing.",

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doi = "10.1037/apl0001290",

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AU - Recendes, Tessa

AU - Hill, Aaron D.

AU - Aime, Federico

AU - Ridge, Jason W.

AU - Petrenko, Oleg V.

PY - 2025

Y1 - 2025

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AB - Integrating theory and evidence about Machiavellianism (Mach) into executive pay-setting research, we theorize about how chief executive officers (CEOs) higher in Mach may be both more motivated to initiate negotiations and more effective in utilizing social influence tactics in the pay-setting process, thus positively relating to their own pay outcomes. Specifically, we first theorize that CEO Mach positively associates with a CEO’s total pay and severance pay. Moreover, because paying top management team (TMT) members more is also in CEOs’ interests—such as to help build TMT loyalty and cooperation, aid hiring, and ease retention while also narrowing the CEO-TMT pay differential to thus provide an impetus for a CEO pay raise—we argue that CEO Mach positively relates to TMT pay as well. Using a longitudinal sample of S&P 500 firms and clinical psychologists trained to assess CEO Mach from publicly available data, we find evidence supporting our theorizing.

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ER -

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Machiavellianism and Executive Pay

Abstract

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