TY - JOUR
T1 - Common auditors in M&A transactions
AU - Cai, Ye
AU - Kim, Yongtae
AU - Park, Jong Chool
AU - White, Hal D.
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors thank Michelle Hanlon (the editor), an anonymous referee, Michael Calegari, Michael Eames, Haidan Li, Siqi Li, Carrie Pan, Michael Stein, and the workshop participants at Santa Clara University and UC Berkeley for their helpful comments. Kim acknowledges financial support from Leavey Grant and the Accounting Department Development Fund at Santa Clara University. Cai acknowledges financial support from University Research Grant from Santa Clara University.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2016/2/1
Y1 - 2016/2/1
N2 - We examine merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in which the acquirer and the target share a common auditor. We predict that a common auditor can help merging firms reduce uncertainty throughout the acquisition process, which allows managers to more efficiently allocate their capital, resulting in higher quality M&As. Consistent with our prediction, we find that deals with common auditors have higher acquisition announcement returns than do non-common-auditor deals. Further, we find that the common-auditor effect is more pronounced for deals with greater pre-acquisition uncertainty and deals involving acquirers and targets that are audited by the same local office of the common auditor. We also find that there is an increased probability of an M&A for firms with a common auditor. Collectively, our evidence suggests that common auditors act as information intermediaries for merging firms, resulting in higher quality acquisitions.
AB - We examine merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in which the acquirer and the target share a common auditor. We predict that a common auditor can help merging firms reduce uncertainty throughout the acquisition process, which allows managers to more efficiently allocate their capital, resulting in higher quality M&As. Consistent with our prediction, we find that deals with common auditors have higher acquisition announcement returns than do non-common-auditor deals. Further, we find that the common-auditor effect is more pronounced for deals with greater pre-acquisition uncertainty and deals involving acquirers and targets that are audited by the same local office of the common auditor. We also find that there is an increased probability of an M&A for firms with a common auditor. Collectively, our evidence suggests that common auditors act as information intermediaries for merging firms, resulting in higher quality acquisitions.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.01.004
DO - 10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.01.004
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84960321202
SN - 0165-4101
VL - 61
SP - 77
EP - 99
JO - Journal of Accounting and Economics
JF - Journal of Accounting and Economics
IS - 1
ER -