TY - JOUR
T1 - Confusion or fairness in the field? Rejections in the ultimatum game under the strategy method
AU - Bahry, Donna L.
AU - Wilson, Rick K.
N1 - Funding Information:
Support from National Science Foundation (OPP 00-82715) and the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research is gratefully acknowledged. Those entities are not responsible for the contents of this manuscript. Thanks also go to David Grether for his careful reading of this manuscript. The second author thanks the Russell Sage Foundation for its wonderful writing environment.
PY - 2006/5
Y1 - 2006/5
N2 - Field experiments conducted in two multi-ethnic republics of Russia show that responders employ varied strategies in an "ultimatum game". While many responders choose strategies that are monotonically rational and characteristic of most ultimatum game results (rejecting low offers and accepting high ones), almost as many others display a tendency towards "hyper-fairness" (rejecting offers that are too low and too high). Proposers, in turn, seem to take this into account with an unusually high proportion of 50/50 splits. Drawing on data from the experiments and a related survey, this paper focuses on the variation in responders' strategies, and the factors that account for the differences.
AB - Field experiments conducted in two multi-ethnic republics of Russia show that responders employ varied strategies in an "ultimatum game". While many responders choose strategies that are monotonically rational and characteristic of most ultimatum game results (rejecting low offers and accepting high ones), almost as many others display a tendency towards "hyper-fairness" (rejecting offers that are too low and too high). Proposers, in turn, seem to take this into account with an unusually high proportion of 50/50 splits. Drawing on data from the experiments and a related survey, this paper focuses on the variation in responders' strategies, and the factors that account for the differences.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.07.005
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.07.005
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33645848122
SN - 0167-2681
VL - 60
SP - 37
EP - 54
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
IS - 1
ER -