Abstract
We construct a model of strategic imitation in an arbitrary network of players who interact through an additive game. Assuming a discrete time update, we show a condition under which the resulting difference equations converge to consensus. Two conjectures on general convergence are also discussed. We then consider the case where players not only may choose their strategies, but also affect their local topology. We show that for the prisoner’s dilemma, the graph structure converges to a set of disconnected cliques and strategic consensus occurs in each clique. Several examples from various matrix games are provided. A variation of the model is then used to create a simple model for the spreading of trends, or information cascades in (e.g., social) networks. We provide theoretical and empirical results on the trend-spreading model.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 597-628 |
Number of pages | 32 |
Journal | SIAM Journal on Applied Dynamical Systems |
Volume | 18 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2019 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Analysis
- Modeling and Simulation