Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain

Avinatan Hassidim; Assaf Romm; Ran I. Shorrer

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.025

Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain

Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We show that many-to-one matching markets with contracts where colleges’ preferences satisfy the hidden substitutes condition of Hatfield and Kominers (2015)may not be embedded, in the sense of Echenique (2012)into a Kelso and Crawford(1982)matching-with-salaries market. Our proof relies on a configurations of preferences that is observed in many college admissions markets.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	40-42
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	181
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.025
State	Published - Aug 2019

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.025

Cite this

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title = "Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain",

abstract = "We show that many-to-one matching markets with contracts where colleges{\textquoteright} preferences satisfy the hidden substitutes condition of Hatfield and Kominers (2015)may not be embedded, in the sense of Echenique (2012)into a Kelso and Crawford(1982)matching-with-salaries market. Our proof relies on a configurations of preferences that is observed in many college admissions markets.",

author = "Avinatan Hassidim and Assaf Romm and Shorrer, {Ran I.}",

note = "Funding Information: We thank Jan Christoph Schlegel for helpful discussions. This research was supported by the United States–Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF)grant 2016015, the Israel Science Foundation (grants 1241/12 and 1780/16), and a Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research, Israel grant. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019",

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AU - Hassidim, Avinatan

AU - Romm, Assaf

AU - Shorrer, Ran I.

N1 - Funding Information: We thank Jan Christoph Schlegel for helpful discussions. This research was supported by the United States–Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF)grant 2016015, the Israel Science Foundation (grants 1241/12 and 1780/16), and a Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research, Israel grant. Publisher Copyright: © 2019

PY - 2019/8

Y1 - 2019/8

N2 - We show that many-to-one matching markets with contracts where colleges’ preferences satisfy the hidden substitutes condition of Hatfield and Kominers (2015)may not be embedded, in the sense of Echenique (2012)into a Kelso and Crawford(1982)matching-with-salaries market. Our proof relies on a configurations of preferences that is observed in many college admissions markets.

AB - We show that many-to-one matching markets with contracts where colleges’ preferences satisfy the hidden substitutes condition of Hatfield and Kominers (2015)may not be embedded, in the sense of Echenique (2012)into a Kelso and Crawford(1982)matching-with-salaries market. Our proof relies on a configurations of preferences that is observed in many college admissions markets.

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain

Abstract

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