TY - JOUR
T1 - Cooperation without reputation
T2 - Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
AU - Cooper, Russell
AU - Dejong, Douglas V.
AU - Forsythe, Robert
AU - Ross, Thomas W.
N1 - Funding Information:
* We are grateful to the National Science Foundation, Price Waterhouse, the University of Iowa, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support and to Zvi Eckstein, Charles Holt, Yong Gwan Kim, and the reviewers and editors for comments and suggestions. Comments by seminar participants at the 1990 meeting of the Economic Science Association, Harvard University, New York University, the Northwestern University Conference on ‘‘Cooperation and Dynamics in Games,’’ the University of Pennsylvania Conference on ‘‘Behavior in Games,’’ the University of Quebec at Montreal, and Queens University are appreciated. † E-mail: [email protected].
PY - 1996/2
Y1 - 1996/2
N2 - This paper investigates cooperative play in prisoner's dilemma games by designing an experiment to evaluate the ability of two leading theories of observed cooperation: reputation building and altruism. We analyze both one-shot and finitely repeated games to gauge the importance of these theories. We conclude that neither altruism nor reputation building alone can explain our observations. The reputation model is inconsistent with play in both one-shots and finitely repeated games while the model with altruism is unable to explain observed play in the finitely repeated games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.
AB - This paper investigates cooperative play in prisoner's dilemma games by designing an experiment to evaluate the ability of two leading theories of observed cooperation: reputation building and altruism. We analyze both one-shot and finitely repeated games to gauge the importance of these theories. We conclude that neither altruism nor reputation building alone can explain our observations. The reputation model is inconsistent with play in both one-shots and finitely repeated games while the model with altruism is unable to explain observed play in the finitely repeated games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.
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U2 - 10.1006/game.1996.0013
DO - 10.1006/game.1996.0013
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0030078443
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 12
SP - 187
EP - 218
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 2
ER -