Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Wayne Roy Gayle, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, Jean François Richard

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


Recent research has highlighted the quantitative contribution to merger analysis from extending unilateral effects models to understand the payoffs to future potential coordinated effects. Some of the emphasis of this research appears to have made its way into the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In this paper, we demonstrate the quantification of coordinated effects in an oligopoly and procurement model, and we show that screens that are based on upward pricing pressure are not adequate in mergers where coordinated effects are a potential concern.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)39-56
Number of pages18
JournalReview of Industrial Organization
Issue number1
StatePublished - Aug 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation


Dive into the research topics of 'Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this