TY - JOUR
T1 - Corruption, Democracy, and Privately Financed Infrastructure
AU - Bertelli, Anthony M.
AU - Mele, Valentina
AU - Woodhouse, Eleanor Florence
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2020.
PY - 2021/3
Y1 - 2021/3
N2 - Do political institutions moderate the influence of corruption on privately financed infrastructure projects? We argue that electoral competition incentivizes politicians to monitor bureaucratic corruption and focus on the public benefits of projects. Without such incentives, corruption is not monitored and the private benefits of bribes and favorable contract terms are responsible for increasing numbers of projects. Studying 116 countries between 1984 and 2012, we find that as public-sector corruption increases in democracies, no change in the number of projects is observed, while more projects emerge in non-democracies as corruption worsens.
AB - Do political institutions moderate the influence of corruption on privately financed infrastructure projects? We argue that electoral competition incentivizes politicians to monitor bureaucratic corruption and focus on the public benefits of projects. Without such incentives, corruption is not monitored and the private benefits of bribes and favorable contract terms are responsible for increasing numbers of projects. Studying 116 countries between 1984 and 2012, we find that as public-sector corruption increases in democracies, no change in the number of projects is observed, while more projects emerge in non-democracies as corruption worsens.
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U2 - 10.1177/0095399720944548
DO - 10.1177/0095399720944548
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85088841959
SN - 0095-3997
VL - 53
SP - 327
EP - 352
JO - Administration and Society
JF - Administration and Society
IS - 3
ER -