CREDIBILITY AND STRATEGIC LEARNING IN NETWORKS

Kalyan Chatterjee; Bhaskar Dutta

doi:10.1111/iere.12175

CREDIBILITY AND STRATEGIC LEARNING IN NETWORKS

Kalyan Chatterjee, Bhaskar Dutta

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze a model of diffusion in a fixed, finite connected network. There is an interested party that knows the quality of the product being propagated and chooses an implant in the network to influence other agents to buy. Agents are either “innovators,” who adopt immediately, or rational. Rational consumers buy if buying instead of waiting maximizes expected utility. We consider the conditions on the network under which optimal diffusion of the good product with probability 1 is a perfect Bayes equilibrium.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	759-786
Number of pages	28
Journal	International Economic Review
Volume	57
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12175
State	Published - Aug 1 2016

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/iere.12175

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CREDIBILITY AND STRATEGIC LEARNING IN NETWORKS

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