Customer concentration, managerial risk aversion, and independent directors: A quasi-natural experiment

Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard, Ploypailin Kijkasiwat, Pornsit Jiraporn, Sang Mook Lee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment based on an exogenous regulatory shock, we explore the effect of board independence on customer concentration. Our difference-in-difference estimates reveal that stronger board independence raises customer concentration. Specifically, a majority of independent directors on the board raise customer concentration by 12.98%− 32.43%. Motivated by managerial risk aversion, managers are in favor of lower customer concentration, resulting in a sub-optimal level of risk-taking. More effective governance in the form of more independent directors increases customer concentration, bringing it closer to the level consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. Additional analysis including propensity score matching and entropy balancing validates the results. Our study is the first to examine the effect of independent directors on customer concentration.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)358-368
Number of pages11
JournalQuarterly Review of Economics and Finance
Volume89
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2023

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Customer concentration, managerial risk aversion, and independent directors: A quasi-natural experiment'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this