Abstract
Nuclear deterrence and cyber war are often discussed as separate worlds of research and military-strategic practice. To the contrary, a certain degree of overlap between nuclear deterrence and cyber conflicts is a plausible expectation for several reasons. First, future deterrent challenges will include regional nuclear arms races accompanied by competition in information technology and other aspects of advanced conventional command-control and precision strike systems. Second, cyber-attacks may be used against opposed nuclear command-control systems and weapons platforms as well as against infrastructure for the purpose of mass disruption during a crisis or war. Third, cyber capabilities support escalation dominance or escalation control, depending on the objectives of states and on the transparency of identification for cyber friends and foes. © 2014
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 279-286 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Comparative Strategy |
Volume | 33 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2014 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Political Science and International Relations