Decentralizing Pork: Congressional Roll-Call Voting, Decentralized Administration, and Distributive Politics

Anthony M. Bertelli; Pamela J.Clouser McCann

doi:10.1111/lsq.12183

Decentralizing Pork: Congressional Roll-Call Voting, Decentralized Administration, and Distributive Politics

Anthony M. Bertelli
, Pamela J.Clouser McCann

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Congress packages pork-barrel spending in complicated proposals that belie theories of distributive politics. We theorize that roll-call voting on such bills depends on grant programs' administrative centralization, party ties with presidents or home-state governors, and differences in geographic representation between chambers. Analyzing votes between 1973 and 2010 using a within-legislator strategy reveals that House members are less likely to support decentralized spending when they are copartisans with presidents, while senators support decentralization regardless of such party ties. When House members or senators share affiliation with only governors or with neither chief executive, the likelihood of support rises with decentralization.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	69-100
Number of pages	32
Journal	Legislative Studies Quarterly
Volume	43
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12183
State	Published - Feb 1 2018

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Sociology and Political Science

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10.1111/lsq.12183

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abstract = "Congress packages pork-barrel spending in complicated proposals that belie theories of distributive politics. We theorize that roll-call voting on such bills depends on grant programs' administrative centralization, party ties with presidents or home-state governors, and differences in geographic representation between chambers. Analyzing votes between 1973 and 2010 using a within-legislator strategy reveals that House members are less likely to support decentralized spending when they are copartisans with presidents, while senators support decentralization regardless of such party ties. When House members or senators share affiliation with only governors or with neither chief executive, the likelihood of support rises with decentralization.",

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AB - Congress packages pork-barrel spending in complicated proposals that belie theories of distributive politics. We theorize that roll-call voting on such bills depends on grant programs' administrative centralization, party ties with presidents or home-state governors, and differences in geographic representation between chambers. Analyzing votes between 1973 and 2010 using a within-legislator strategy reveals that House members are less likely to support decentralized spending when they are copartisans with presidents, while senators support decentralization regardless of such party ties. When House members or senators share affiliation with only governors or with neither chief executive, the likelihood of support rises with decentralization.

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Decentralizing Pork: Congressional Roll-Call Voting, Decentralized Administration, and Distributive Politics

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