Decolonising academia: procedural and substantive epistemic justice

Academic institutions have introduced diversity-related procedures in no small part due to increasing pressure from activist groups like the ‘Decolonise Academia’ movement. However, it is unclear how successful these procedures have been in achieving their purported aims, and more than that, how aligned they are with the goals of said activist movements. In my paper, focusing on the epistemic dimensions of ‘decolonising academia’, I highlight a crucial distinction between procedural and substantive forms of epistemic justice, emphasising that current procedural modes of epistemic justice may lead us down the wrong path, worsening pre-existing ‘epistemic woes’ rather than ameliorating them. More concretely, I provide an elaborated diagnosis of how the problems of elite capture, virtue-signalling, and credibility excess can obstruct substantive epistemic justice in educational institutions even if procedurally just norms have been implemented. I conclude with brief remarks on how these three woes can be addressed, underscoring the importance of procedural reform.