Defending against packet injection attacks in unreliable ad hoc networks

Qijun Gu; Peng Liu; Sencun Zhu; Chao Hsien Chu

doi:10.1109/GLOCOM.2005.1577966

Defending against packet injection attacks in unreliable ad hoc networks

Qijun Gu, Peng Liu, Sencun Zhu, Chao Hsien Chu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

Ad hoc networks are usually unreliable and have limited bandwidth resources. In such networks, packet injection attacks can cause serious denial-of-service via wireless channel contention and network congestion. To defend against this type of injection attacks, we propose SAF, an efficient and effective Source Authentication Forwarding protocol. The protocol can either immediately filter out injected Junk packets with very high probability or expose the true identity of an injector. Differing from other forwarding defenses, this protocol is designed to fit in the unreliable environment of ad hoc networks. Our simulation shows that SAF incurs very lightweight overhead in communication and computation.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	GLOBECOM'05
Subtitle of host publication	IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2005
Pages	1837-1841
Number of pages	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2005.1577966
State	Published - 2005
Event	GLOBECOM'05: IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2005 - St. Louis, MO, United States Duration: Nov 28 2005 → Dec 2 2005

Publication series

Name	GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
Volume	3

Other

Other	GLOBECOM'05: IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2005
Country/Territory	United States
City	St. Louis, MO
Period	11/28/05 → 12/2/05

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/GLOCOM.2005.1577966

Cite this

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title = "Defending against packet injection attacks in unreliable ad hoc networks",

abstract = "Ad hoc networks are usually unreliable and have limited bandwidth resources. In such networks, packet injection attacks can cause serious denial-of-service via wireless channel contention and network congestion. To defend against this type of injection attacks, we propose SAF, an efficient and effective Source Authentication Forwarding protocol. The protocol can either immediately filter out injected Junk packets with very high probability or expose the true identity of an injector. Differing from other forwarding defenses, this protocol is designed to fit in the unreliable environment of ad hoc networks. Our simulation shows that SAF incurs very lightweight overhead in communication and computation.",

author = "Qijun Gu and Peng Liu and Sencun Zhu and Chu, {Chao Hsien}",

year = "2005",

doi = "10.1109/GLOCOM.2005.1577966",

language = "English (US)",

isbn = "0780394143",

series = "GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference",

pages = "1837--1841",

booktitle = "GLOBECOM'05",

note = "GLOBECOM'05: IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2005 ; Conference date: 28-11-2005 Through 02-12-2005",

}

Gu, Q, Liu, P , Zhu, S & Chu, CH 2005, Defending against packet injection attacks in unreliable ad hoc networks. in GLOBECOM'05: IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2005., 1577966, GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, vol. 3, pp. 1837-1841, GLOBECOM'05: IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2005, St. Louis, MO, United States, 11/28/05. https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2005.1577966

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T1 - Defending against packet injection attacks in unreliable ad hoc networks

AU - Gu, Qijun

AU - Liu, Peng

AU - Zhu, Sencun

AU - Chu, Chao Hsien

PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 - Ad hoc networks are usually unreliable and have limited bandwidth resources. In such networks, packet injection attacks can cause serious denial-of-service via wireless channel contention and network congestion. To defend against this type of injection attacks, we propose SAF, an efficient and effective Source Authentication Forwarding protocol. The protocol can either immediately filter out injected Junk packets with very high probability or expose the true identity of an injector. Differing from other forwarding defenses, this protocol is designed to fit in the unreliable environment of ad hoc networks. Our simulation shows that SAF incurs very lightweight overhead in communication and computation.

AB - Ad hoc networks are usually unreliable and have limited bandwidth resources. In such networks, packet injection attacks can cause serious denial-of-service via wireless channel contention and network congestion. To defend against this type of injection attacks, we propose SAF, an efficient and effective Source Authentication Forwarding protocol. The protocol can either immediately filter out injected Junk packets with very high probability or expose the true identity of an injector. Differing from other forwarding defenses, this protocol is designed to fit in the unreliable environment of ad hoc networks. Our simulation shows that SAF incurs very lightweight overhead in communication and computation.

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DO - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2005.1577966

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:33846606856

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SN - 9780780394148

T3 - GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference

SP - 1837

EP - 1841

BT - GLOBECOM'05

T2 - GLOBECOM'05: IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2005

Y2 - 28 November 2005 through 2 December 2005

ER -

Defending against packet injection attacks in unreliable ad hoc networks

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