TY - JOUR
T1 - Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
AU - Fudenberg, Drew
AU - Ishii, Yuhta
AU - Kominers, Scott Duke
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors thank Attila Ambrus, Eduardo Faingold, Daniel Fudenberg, Johannes Hörner, Yuichiro Kamada, Wojciech Olszewski, Takuo Sugaya, Satoru Takahashi, Yuichi Yamamoto, the associate editor, and several referees for helpful comments. This work was supported by NSF grants SES-0951462 and CCF-1216095 , an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship , a Yahoo! Key Scientific Challenges Program Fellowship , a Terence M. Considine Fellowship funded by the John M. Olin Center at Harvard Law School , the Harvard Milton Fund , and an AMS-Simons Travel Grant . Much of this work was conducted while Kominers was a research scholar at the Becker Friedman Institute at the University of Chicago.
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect signal of period. t play with some lag or else never sees a signal of period. t play. The second model has the same lag structure, but the information structure corresponds to a lagged form of imperfect public monitoring, and players are allowed to communicate via cheap-talk messages at the end of each period. In each case, we construct equilibria in "delayed-response strategies," which ensure that players wait long enough to respond to signals that with high probability all relevant signals are received before players respond. To do so, we extend past work on private monitoring to obtain folk theorems despite the small residual amount of private information.
AB - We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect signal of period. t play with some lag or else never sees a signal of period. t play. The second model has the same lag structure, but the information structure corresponds to a lagged form of imperfect public monitoring, and players are allowed to communicate via cheap-talk messages at the end of each period. In each case, we construct equilibria in "delayed-response strategies," which ensure that players wait long enough to respond to signals that with high probability all relevant signals are received before players respond. To do so, we extend past work on private monitoring to obtain folk theorems despite the small residual amount of private information.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.004
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.004
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84894087456
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 150
SP - 487
EP - 514
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -