TY - GEN
T1 - DEMO
T2 - 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2012
AU - Pan, Xian
AU - Ling, Zhen
AU - Pingley, Aniket
AU - Yu, Wei
AU - Zhang, Nan
AU - Fu, Xinwen
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - Raw mouse movement data can be sniffed via off-the-shelf tools. In this demo, we show that such data, while seemingly harmless, may reveal extremely sensitive information such as passwords. Nonetheless, such a Bluetooth-mousesniffing attack can be challenging to perform mainly because of two reasons: (i) packet loss is common for Bluetooth traffic, and (ii) modern operating systems use complex mouse acceleration strategies, which make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct the precise on-screen cursor coordinates from raw mouse movements. To address those challenges, we have conducted an extensive and careful study, over multiple operating systems, on the reconstruction of mouse cursor trajectory from raw mouse data and the inference of privacy-sensitive information - e.g., user password - from the reconstructed trajectory. Our experimental data demonstrate the severity of privacy leaking from un-encrypted Bluetooth mouse. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to retrieve sensitive information from sniffed mouse raw data. Video links of successful replay attack for different target OS are given in Section 3.2.
AB - Raw mouse movement data can be sniffed via off-the-shelf tools. In this demo, we show that such data, while seemingly harmless, may reveal extremely sensitive information such as passwords. Nonetheless, such a Bluetooth-mousesniffing attack can be challenging to perform mainly because of two reasons: (i) packet loss is common for Bluetooth traffic, and (ii) modern operating systems use complex mouse acceleration strategies, which make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct the precise on-screen cursor coordinates from raw mouse movements. To address those challenges, we have conducted an extensive and careful study, over multiple operating systems, on the reconstruction of mouse cursor trajectory from raw mouse data and the inference of privacy-sensitive information - e.g., user password - from the reconstructed trajectory. Our experimental data demonstrate the severity of privacy leaking from un-encrypted Bluetooth mouse. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to retrieve sensitive information from sniffed mouse raw data. Video links of successful replay attack for different target OS are given in Section 3.2.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84869448138&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84869448138&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/2382196.2382309
DO - 10.1145/2382196.2382309
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84869448138
SN - 9781450316507
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 1013
EP - 1015
BT - CCS'12 - Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Y2 - 16 October 2012 through 18 October 2012
ER -