TY - GEN
T1 - Determining a discrete set of site-constrained privacy options for users in social networks through stackelberg games
AU - Rajtmajer, Sarah
AU - Griffin, Christopher
AU - Squicciarini, Anna
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015.
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - The privacy policies of an online social network play an important role in determining user involvement and satisfaction, and in turn site profit and success. In this paper, we develop a game theoretic framework to model the relationship between the set of privacy options offered by a social network site and the sharing decisions of its users within these constraints.We model the site and the users in this scenario as the leader and followers, respectively, in a Stackelberg game. We formally establish the conditions under which this game reaches a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and provide an approximation algorithm for the site to determine a discrete set of privacy options to maximize payoff. We validate hypotheses in our model on data collected from a mock-social network of users’ privacy preferences both within and outside the context of peer influence, and demonstrate that the qualitative assumptions of our model are well-founded.
AB - The privacy policies of an online social network play an important role in determining user involvement and satisfaction, and in turn site profit and success. In this paper, we develop a game theoretic framework to model the relationship between the set of privacy options offered by a social network site and the sharing decisions of its users within these constraints.We model the site and the users in this scenario as the leader and followers, respectively, in a Stackelberg game. We formally establish the conditions under which this game reaches a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and provide an approximation algorithm for the site to determine a discrete set of privacy options to maximize payoff. We validate hypotheses in our model on data collected from a mock-social network of users’ privacy preferences both within and outside the context of peer influence, and demonstrate that the qualitative assumptions of our model are well-founded.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84953236543&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84953236543&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_12
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_12
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84953236543
SN - 9783319255934
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 208
EP - 227
BT - Decision and Game Theory for Security - 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, Proceedings
A2 - Khouzani, M.H.R.
A2 - Panaousis, Emmanouil
A2 - Theodorakopoulos, George
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 6th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2015
Y2 - 4 November 2015 through 5 November 2015
ER -