TY - GEN
T1 - DiffGuard
T2 - 13th EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks, SecureComm 2017
AU - Zhu, Jun
AU - Zhou, Weiping
AU - Wang, Zhilong
AU - Mu, Dongliang
AU - Mao, Bing
N1 - Funding Information:
We would like to thank Theofilos Petsios et al. for their open source implementation of DynaGuard which helps ours quickly getting start of out work. When we have trouble in using SPEC CPU2006, Theofilos Petsios give us some advice. This work was supported in part by grants from the Chinese National Natural Science Foundation (61272078).
Funding Information:
Acknowledgments. We would like to thank Theofilos Petsios et al. for their open source implementation of DynaGuard which helps ours quickly getting start of out work. When we have trouble in using SPEC CPU2006, Theofilos Petsios give us some advice. This work was supported in part by grants from the Chinese National Natural Science Foundation (61272078).
Publisher Copyright:
© ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2018.
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - Memory Corruption attacks have monopolized the headlines in the security research community for the past two decades. NX/XD, ASLR, and canary-based protections have been introduced to defend effectively against memory corruption attacks. Most of these techniques rely on keeping secret in some key information needed by the attackers to build the exploit. Unfortunately, due to the inherent limitations of these defenses, it is relatively difficult to restrain trained attackers to find those secrets and create effective exploits. Through an information disclosure vulnerability, attackers could leak stack data of the runtime process and scan out canary word without crashing the program. We present DiffGuard, a modification of the canary based protections which eliminates stack sweep attacks against the canary and proposes a more robust countermeasures against the byte-by-byte discovery of stack canaries in forking programs. We have implemented a compiler-based DiffGuard which consists of a plugin for the GCC and a PIC dynamic shared library that gets linked with the running application via LD PRELOAD. DiffGuard incurs an average runtime overhead of 3.2%, meanwhile, ensures application correctness and seamless integration with third-party software.
AB - Memory Corruption attacks have monopolized the headlines in the security research community for the past two decades. NX/XD, ASLR, and canary-based protections have been introduced to defend effectively against memory corruption attacks. Most of these techniques rely on keeping secret in some key information needed by the attackers to build the exploit. Unfortunately, due to the inherent limitations of these defenses, it is relatively difficult to restrain trained attackers to find those secrets and create effective exploits. Through an information disclosure vulnerability, attackers could leak stack data of the runtime process and scan out canary word without crashing the program. We present DiffGuard, a modification of the canary based protections which eliminates stack sweep attacks against the canary and proposes a more robust countermeasures against the byte-by-byte discovery of stack canaries in forking programs. We have implemented a compiler-based DiffGuard which consists of a plugin for the GCC and a PIC dynamic shared library that gets linked with the running application via LD PRELOAD. DiffGuard incurs an average runtime overhead of 3.2%, meanwhile, ensures application correctness and seamless integration with third-party software.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-78813-5_39
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-78813-5_39
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85045991698
SN - 9783319788128
T3 - Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST
SP - 738
EP - 751
BT - Security and Privacy in Communication Networks - 13th International Conference, SecureComm 2017, Proceedings
A2 - Ghorbani, Ali
A2 - Lin, Xiaodong
A2 - Ren, Kui
A2 - Zhu, Sencun
A2 - Zhang, Aiqing
PB - Springer Verlag
Y2 - 22 October 2017 through 25 October 2017
ER -