Abstract
We explore the processes that unfolded during NASA's ill-fated Columbia shuttle flight, as members of the mission team struggled to understand the significance of an unexpected foam-shedding event. It was difficult to categorize this event in real time, as two different criteria ĝ€" a concern for safety and a concern for meeting schedules ĝ€" were being used. Using in-depth data gathered on the Columbia shuttle flight, we describe the sensemaking processes that unfolded and discuss the implications for organizations.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 397-421 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Organization Studies |
Volume | 30 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Apr 2009 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Strategy and Management
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation