TY - JOUR
T1 - Distributed medium access control with conditionally altruistic users
AU - Antoniadis, Panayotis
AU - Fdida, Serge
AU - Griffin, Christopher
AU - Jin, Youngmi
AU - Kesidis, George
N1 - Funding Information:
GK was supported by NSF CISE grants 0524202 and 0915928 by a Cisco Systems URP gift; PA was supported by EINS, the Network of Excellence in Internet Science EC’s FP7 grant 288021. YJ was supported by NRF-2013R1A1A3A04007104. Elements of this paper were presented at the IEEE CDC, Atlanta, 2010 and AdHocNets, Paris, 2012 conferences.
PY - 2013/12
Y1 - 2013/12
N2 - In this paper, we consider medium access control of local area networks (LANs) under limited-information conditions as befits a distributed system. Rather than assuming 'by rule' conformance to a protocol designed to regulate packet-flow rates (e.g., CSMA windowing), we begin with a non-cooperative game framework and build a dynamic, conditional, altruism term into the net utility. The effects of altruism are analyzed at Nash equilibrium for the carrier sense multiple access (CSMA)-like random-access framework in the quasi-stationary (fictitious play) regime. We consider either power or throughput-based costs of networking, and the cases of identical or heterogeneous (independent) players. Unlike related work in this area, our objective is not to optimize the performance of the system but to formulate a realistic economic model capturing altruistic motivations. This model can then form the basis for higher-level incentive schemes that will encourage altruistic, instead of selfish, behavior. In a numerical study we consider the cases of identical or diverse players and show interesting relationships between the main parameters of our model and comparisons with other alternatives discussed in the literature.
AB - In this paper, we consider medium access control of local area networks (LANs) under limited-information conditions as befits a distributed system. Rather than assuming 'by rule' conformance to a protocol designed to regulate packet-flow rates (e.g., CSMA windowing), we begin with a non-cooperative game framework and build a dynamic, conditional, altruism term into the net utility. The effects of altruism are analyzed at Nash equilibrium for the carrier sense multiple access (CSMA)-like random-access framework in the quasi-stationary (fictitious play) regime. We consider either power or throughput-based costs of networking, and the cases of identical or heterogeneous (independent) players. Unlike related work in this area, our objective is not to optimize the performance of the system but to formulate a realistic economic model capturing altruistic motivations. This model can then form the basis for higher-level incentive schemes that will encourage altruistic, instead of selfish, behavior. In a numerical study we consider the cases of identical or diverse players and show interesting relationships between the main parameters of our model and comparisons with other alternatives discussed in the literature.
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U2 - 10.1186/1687-1499-2013-202
DO - 10.1186/1687-1499-2013-202
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84894163314
SN - 1687-1472
VL - 2013
JO - Eurasip Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
JF - Eurasip Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
IS - 1
M1 - 202
ER -