TY - GEN
T1 - Distributed medium access control with dynamic altruism
AU - Antoniadis, Panayotis
AU - Fdida, Serge
AU - Griffin, Christopher
AU - Jin, Youngmi
AU - Kesidis, George
N1 - Funding Information:
The work was supported by NSF CISE grants 0524202 and 0915928, by EINS, the Network of Excellence in Internet Science EC’s FP7 grant 288021, and by a Cisco Systems URP gift.
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - In this paper, we consider medium access control of local area networks (LANs) under limited-information conditions as befits a distributed system. Rather than assuming "by rule" conformance to a protocol designed to regulate packet-flow rates (as in, e.g., CSMA windowing), we begin with a non-cooperative game framework and build a dynamic altruism term into the net utility. Our objective is to define a utility model that captures more closely the expected behavior of users, which according to recent results from behavioral and experimental economics should include a conditionally altruistic dimension. The effects of our proposed dynamic altruism are analyzed at Nash equilibrium in the quasi-stationary (fictitious play) regime. We consider either power or throughput based costs, and the cases of identical or heterogeneous (independent) users/players.
AB - In this paper, we consider medium access control of local area networks (LANs) under limited-information conditions as befits a distributed system. Rather than assuming "by rule" conformance to a protocol designed to regulate packet-flow rates (as in, e.g., CSMA windowing), we begin with a non-cooperative game framework and build a dynamic altruism term into the net utility. Our objective is to define a utility model that captures more closely the expected behavior of users, which according to recent results from behavioral and experimental economics should include a conditionally altruistic dimension. The effects of our proposed dynamic altruism are analyzed at Nash equilibrium in the quasi-stationary (fictitious play) regime. We consider either power or throughput based costs, and the cases of identical or heterogeneous (independent) users/players.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-36958-2_3
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-36958-2_3
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84883065478
SN - 9783642369575
T3 - Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST
SP - 29
EP - 42
BT - Ad Hoc Networks - Fourth International Conference, ADHOCNETS 2012
T2 - 4th International Conference on Ad Hoc Networks, ADHOCNETS 2012
Y2 - 16 October 2012 through 17 October 2012
ER -