Divisionalization and franchising incentives with integral competing units

Michael R. Baye; Keith J. Crocker; Jiandong Ju

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(95)00779-2

Divisionalization and franchising incentives with integral competing units

Michael R. Baye, Keith J. Crocker, Jiandong Ju

Risk Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

Existing game-theoretic models of divisionalization and franchising treat each firm's number of competing units as a continuous variable. We account for the integer constraint on divisions, and show that the continuous case reasonably approximates the equilibria of the discrete game.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	429-435
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	50
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(95)00779-2
State	Published - Mar 1996

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/0165-1765(95)00779-2

Cite this

@article{7a307f9189a544cfaa251ab485779c8f,

title = "Divisionalization and franchising incentives with integral competing units",

abstract = "Existing game-theoretic models of divisionalization and franchising treat each firm's number of competing units as a continuous variable. We account for the integer constraint on divisions, and show that the continuous case reasonably approximates the equilibria of the discrete game.",

author = "Baye, \{Michael R.\} and Crocker, \{Keith J.\} and Jiandong Ju",

year = "1996",

month = mar,

doi = "10.1016/0165-1765(95)00779-2",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "50",

pages = "429--435",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Divisionalization and franchising incentives with integral competing units

AU - Baye, Michael R.

AU - Crocker, Keith J.

AU - Ju, Jiandong

PY - 1996/3

Y1 - 1996/3

N2 - Existing game-theoretic models of divisionalization and franchising treat each firm's number of competing units as a continuous variable. We account for the integer constraint on divisions, and show that the continuous case reasonably approximates the equilibria of the discrete game.

AB - Existing game-theoretic models of divisionalization and franchising treat each firm's number of competing units as a continuous variable. We account for the integer constraint on divisions, and show that the continuous case reasonably approximates the equilibria of the discrete game.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0030306169

UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0030306169&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/0165-1765(95)00779-2

DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(95)00779-2

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0030306169

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 50

SP - 429

EP - 435

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 3

ER -

Divisionalization and franchising incentives with integral competing units

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this