Abstract
Existing game-theoretic models of divisionalization and franchising treat each firm's number of competing units as a continuous variable. We account for the integer constraint on divisions, and show that the continuous case reasonably approximates the equilibria of the discrete game.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 429-435 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 1996 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
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