Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity

Ran I. Shorrer, Sándor Sóvágó

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

College applicants often make dominated choices even when a strategically simple mechanism such as deferred acceptance is in place. We study Hungarian college admissions, where deferred acceptance is used, and still many college applicants make revealed dominated choices: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver. Using two empirical strategies, we show that when admission with a tuition waiver becomes more selective, applicants make more revealed dominated choices. Our results suggest that dominated choices respond to economic incentives.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)167-182
Number of pages16
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume144
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2024

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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