TY - JOUR
T1 - Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism
T2 - The effect of admission selectivity
AU - Shorrer, Ran I.
AU - Sóvágó, Sándor
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2024/3
Y1 - 2024/3
N2 - College applicants often make dominated choices even when a strategically simple mechanism such as deferred acceptance is in place. We study Hungarian college admissions, where deferred acceptance is used, and still many college applicants make revealed dominated choices: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver. Using two empirical strategies, we show that when admission with a tuition waiver becomes more selective, applicants make more revealed dominated choices. Our results suggest that dominated choices respond to economic incentives.
AB - College applicants often make dominated choices even when a strategically simple mechanism such as deferred acceptance is in place. We study Hungarian college admissions, where deferred acceptance is used, and still many college applicants make revealed dominated choices: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver. Using two empirical strategies, we show that when admission with a tuition waiver becomes more selective, applicants make more revealed dominated choices. Our results suggest that dominated choices respond to economic incentives.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85184470061&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85184470061&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.002
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85184470061
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 144
SP - 167
EP - 182
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -