TY - JOUR
T1 - Economic policy in the presence of coordination problems
AU - Cooper, Russell Wade
PY - 2005/1/1
Y1 - 2005/1/1
N2 - This paper discusses the conduct of government policy in coordination games. In economic situations with multiple equilibria, government intervention may be valuable to overcome coordination problems and to internalize externalities. Yet, the design of optimal interventions is made more difficult by the presence of strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria.
AB - This paper discusses the conduct of government policy in coordination games. In economic situations with multiple equilibria, government intervention may be valuable to overcome coordination problems and to internalize externalities. Yet, the design of optimal interventions is made more difficult by the presence of strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33947676353&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33947676353&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.3917/redp.154.0379
DO - 10.3917/redp.154.0379
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33947676353
SN - 0373-2630
VL - 115
JO - Revue d'Economie Politique
JF - Revue d'Economie Politique
IS - 4
ER -