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Endogenous limits on veto power in dynamic bargaining
Ravideep Sethi
,
Ewout Verriest
Economics
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peer-review
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Dive into the research topics of 'Endogenous limits on veto power in dynamic bargaining'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Keyphrases
Veto Power
100%
Dynamic Bargaining
100%
Veto Players
75%
Divergence
25%
Additional Power
25%
Strategic Substitutes
25%
Novel Prediction
25%
Legislative Bargaining
25%
Egalitarianism
25%
Expropriation
25%
Bargaining Model
25%
Markov Perfect Equilibrium
25%
Fixed Budget
25%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Expropriation
100%