Equilibrium existence in games with ties

Wojciech Olszewski; Ron Siegel

doi:10.3982/TE5067

Equilibrium existence in games with ties

Wojciech Olszewski
, Ron Siegel

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We provide conditions that simplify applying Reny's (1999) better-reply security to Bayesian games and use these conditions to prove the existence of equilibria for classes of games in which payoff discontinuities arise only at “ties.” These games include a general version of all-pay contests, first-prize auctions with common values, and Hotelling models with incomplete information.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	481-502
Number of pages	22
Journal	Theoretical Economics
Volume	18
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5067
State	Published - May 2023

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Access to Document

10.3982/TE5067

Cite this

@article{caa990f5589e4f77956d0a67e94d445c,

title = "Equilibrium existence in games with ties",

abstract = "We provide conditions that simplify applying Reny's (1999) better-reply security to Bayesian games and use these conditions to prove the existence of equilibria for classes of games in which payoff discontinuities arise only at “ties.” These games include a general version of all-pay contests, first-prize auctions with common values, and Hotelling models with incomplete information.",

author = "Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel",

note = "Publisher Copyright: Copyright {\textcopyright} 2023 The Authors.",

year = "2023",

month = may,

doi = "10.3982/TE5067",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "18",

pages = "481--502",

journal = "Theoretical Economics",

issn = "1933-6837",

publisher = "Society for Economic Theory",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Equilibrium existence in games with ties

AU - Olszewski, Wojciech

AU - Siegel, Ron

PY - 2023/5

Y1 - 2023/5

N2 - We provide conditions that simplify applying Reny's (1999) better-reply security to Bayesian games and use these conditions to prove the existence of equilibria for classes of games in which payoff discontinuities arise only at “ties.” These games include a general version of all-pay contests, first-prize auctions with common values, and Hotelling models with incomplete information.

AB - We provide conditions that simplify applying Reny's (1999) better-reply security to Bayesian games and use these conditions to prove the existence of equilibria for classes of games in which payoff discontinuities arise only at “ties.” These games include a general version of all-pay contests, first-prize auctions with common values, and Hotelling models with incomplete information.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85159925200

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85159925200#tab=citedBy

U2 - 10.3982/TE5067

DO - 10.3982/TE5067

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85159925200

SN - 1933-6837

VL - 18

SP - 481

EP - 502

JO - Theoretical Economics

JF - Theoretical Economics

IS - 2

ER -

Equilibrium existence in games with ties

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this