Evolving public perceptions and stability in vaccine uptake

Timothy C. Reluga, Chris T. Bauch, Alison P. Galvani

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

167 Scopus citations


Recent vaccine scares and sudden spikes in vaccine demand remind us that the effectiveness of mass vaccination programs is governed by the public perception of vaccination. Previous work has shown that the tendency of individuals to optimize self-interest can lead to vaccination levels that are suboptimal for a community. We use game theory to relate population-level demand for vaccines to decision-making by individuals with varied beliefs about the costs of infection and vaccination. In contrast to previous work proposing that universal vaccination is impossible in a game theoretic context, we show that optimal individual behavior can vary between universal vaccination and no vaccination, depending on the relative costs and benefits to individuals. By coupling game models and epidemic models, we demonstrate that the pursuit of self-interest often leads to stable dynamics but can lead to oscillations in vaccine uptake over time. The instability is exacerbated in populations that are more homogeneous with respect to their perceptions of vaccine and infection risks. This research illustrates the importance of applying temporal models to an inherently temporal situation, namely, the time evolution of vaccine coverage in an informed population with a voluntary vaccination policy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)185-198
Number of pages14
JournalMathematical Biosciences
Issue number2
StatePublished - Dec 2006

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology
  • General Immunology and Microbiology
  • General Agricultural and Biological Sciences
  • Applied Mathematics


Dive into the research topics of 'Evolving public perceptions and stability in vaccine uptake'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this