Fair Stable Matching Meets Correlated Preferences

Angelina Brilliantova, Hadi Hosseini

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint sets of agents wherein no pair of agents prefer each other to their matched partners. The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure that guarantees a stable matching for any input; however, its outcome may be unfair as it always favors one side by returning a matching that is optimal for one side (say men) and pessimal for the other side (say women). A desirable fairness notion is minimizing the sex-equality cost, i.e. the difference between the total rankings of both sides. Computing such stable matchings is a strongly NP-hard problem, which raises the question of what tractable algorithms to adopt in practice. We conduct a series of empirical evaluations on the properties of sex-equal stable matchings when preferences of agents on both sides are correlated. Our empirical results suggest that under correlated preferences, the DA algorithm returns stable matchings with low sex-equality cost, which further confirms its broad use in many practical applications.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationInternational Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2022
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages190-198
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781713854333
StatePublished - 2022
Event21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2022 - Auckland, Virtual, New Zealand
Duration: May 9 2022May 13 2022

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume1
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2022
Country/TerritoryNew Zealand
CityAuckland, Virtual
Period5/9/225/13/22

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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