TY - GEN
T1 - Fair Stable Matchings Under Correlated Preferences (Student Abstract)
AU - Brilliantova, Angelina
AU - Hosseini, Hadi
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2021, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Stable matching models are widely used in market design, school admission, and donor organ exchange. The classic Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm guarantees a stable matching that is optimal for one side (say men) and pessimal for the other (say women). A sex-equal stable matching aims at providing a fair solution to this problem. We demonstrate that under a class of correlated preferences, the DA algorithm either returns a sex-equal solution or has a very low sex-equality cost.
AB - Stable matching models are widely used in market design, school admission, and donor organ exchange. The classic Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm guarantees a stable matching that is optimal for one side (say men) and pessimal for the other (say women). A sex-equal stable matching aims at providing a fair solution to this problem. We demonstrate that under a class of correlated preferences, the DA algorithm either returns a sex-equal solution or has a very low sex-equality cost.
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M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85130022572
T3 - 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2021
SP - 15763
EP - 15764
BT - 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2021
PB - Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
T2 - 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2021
Y2 - 2 February 2021 through 9 February 2021
ER -